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Hedge Funds, Hot Markets and the
High Net Worth Investor: A Case for
Greater Protection?
By Helen Parry
I. INTRODUCTION: HEDGE FUNDS AND HIGH
NET WORTH INDIVIDUALS
"Hedge funds, so often booed and hissed by politicians and regulators,
are now strutting their stuff in the limelight to the acclaim ofpension funds,
unit trusts and private investors. "
A. Hedge Funds Are Back
Jaded and shocked investors, reeling from the devastating effects of the
dot.corn crash, are turning to hedge funds and other forms of alternative in-
vestment in the hope of beating current downward trends in equity markets.
The proud boast of hedge fund managers that they can produce absolute re-
turns even when such market conditions prevail is inevitably alluring, and
there is ample evidence that the hedge fund market is "red hot."2 Of par-
ticular interest are classic hedge fund strategies, in the tradition of the father
of modem hedge fund investing, Alfred Winslow Jones. These strategies
are based on the principle of taking long positions in undervalued stocks
and short positions in overvalued stocks with a modest element of lever-
age.3 Highly-leveraged hedge funds, in the style of Long Term Capital
1 Sprucing Up Their Appearance, MONEY OBsERVER, Sept. 19, 2000.
2 Robert Clow, UBSAttacks Hedge Market, FINANCIAL TIMES, March 8,2001.
3 "Imagine for instance that Jones had $10,000 to invest. He would borrow 50% of this
figure, then buy perhaps $10,000 of stocks and sell short $5,000. Capital had to be put up to
enable the short sales to take place, or to be held in reserve for topping up margin calls if
they didn't perform as expected. So while the total involvement in the market represented
$15,000 (150% of his capital) his net exposure as a percentage of his capital was potentially
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Management, are clearly not in favor today, as the market is still recovering
from the shock of the LTCM collapse.
In further great contrast to the LTCM style of investing, Jones, who
was actively trading in the 50's and 60's, had to devise his strategies with-
out the benefit of the sophisticated mathematical and computing techniques
so beloved by the "quant jocks" of the 90s.
B. Hedge Funds And High Net Worth Investors In The U.S. And U.K.
In terms of private client investment, the new wave of hedge fund op-
portunities is principally being targeted at high net worth individuals
("HNWIs"), or in some cases "ultra high net worth individuals."4 Given the
growing disparity between the richest and the poorest in society, more and
more individuals are falling into this category. Armies of bankers, brokers,
lawyers and accountants eager to tap into this lucrative and expanding mar-
ket are eagerly courting them. Indeed, regulatory regimes are reacting to
the pressures caused by these changing market conditions of increased pri-
vate client investment in more risky and exotic investments, like hedge
funds and derivatives generally, by making subtle adjustments to the scope
of their regulatory reach.
In the U.S., the Investment Company Act of 1940 provides regulatory
relief from registration as an investment company under Section 3(c)(1).
This applies to private investment companies with less than 100 sharehold-
ers that make no public offerings of securities. However, in 1992, the Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") decided that this exclusion was
inappropriately restrictive in the context of changing market conditions and
the growing numbers of wealthy and sophisticated investors. The SEC pro-
posed also granting relief from registration to companies that sold invest-
ments solely to "qualified purchasers" considered by the SEC to be
sufficiently sophisticated, based on their wealth, not to require protection.
Investment companies may now have unrestricted numbers of qualified
purchasers under this Section 3 (c) 7 exclusion. An individual may be a
qualified purchaser if he owns not less than $5 million in investments. 5
This has opened the door to larger pools of hedge fund investors. These
new rules came into effect in June 1997.
only 50%, the $10,000 of stocks he had bought less the $5000 he had sold short. If the stocks
he had bought went up and the shorts he had sold went down, returns would be magnified."
Peter Temple, The Long and Short of Hedge Funds, FiNANCiAL TIMES, March 3, 2001.
4 "We are really interested in high net worth individuals who have $imillion to $10 mil-
lion, and ultra high net worth individuals who have $10 million plus to invest." John Mait-
land, managing director for the Merrill Lynch Britain and Ireland private client division,
quoted in 'Money and Banking: do you have a million dollars?' Sunday Business Post Ire-
land February 25, 2001.
5 Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 80(a)(2)(51)(a).
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The Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") also provides
regulatory relief for commodity pools involving "qualified eligible partici-
pants." An individual may be a qualified eligible participant if he owns and
controls for his own account at least $2 million in securities or other in-
vestment assets or has deposited at least $200,000 initial margin and op-
tions premiums with a futures commission merchant for commodity futures
trading.6 The CFTC has also recently adopted an amendment to Rule 4.7 to
add several categories of persons to the definition of qualified eligible par-
ticipant.7
Hedge funds are normally categorized in the UK system as unregulated
collective schemes and, as such, they are covered by fairly severe marketing
restrictions. The basic position under the new Financial Services and Mar-
kets Act of 2000, when it is implemented later this year, will be that firms
are prohibited from communicating or approving a financial promotion re-
lating to an unregulated collective investment scheme to individuals unless
they are "sophisticated" investors. There are no significant changes to the
existing Financial Services Act regime.8
C. Risks In Hedge Fund Trading Strategies
While in today's market climate there is particular interest in the clas-
sic Jones "long/short" and the related "market neutral" strategies for invest-
ing in hedge funds, investors who are new to this market should be aware
that, in the past, regulators have had to deal with a number of problems with
funds using these techniques. When, contrary to the best expectations of
the best computer programs in the world, the supposedly undervalued
stocks decrease in value, and the overvalued stocks increase in value, seri-
ous losses can quickly mount up. Such losses may be exacerbated to devas-
tating effects when leverage is factored into the situation.
The D.E Shaw fund used complex mathematical formulae to predict
market behavior and the managers of the fund devised computer models to
take advantage of market inefficiencies in the pricing of various securities.
6 17 C.F.R., ch. 1, Section 4.7(B)(1)(i)-(ii).
7 The Year in Review, CFTC, 2000, at 9.
8 Section 76(1) of the Financial Services Act prohibits the marketing of unregulated col-
lective investment schemes (i.e. any scheme which is not a unit trust, U.K. Open Ended In-
vestment Company or a non-U.K. scheme recognized by the Financial Services Authority
(FSA)). Financial Services Act, 1986, ch. 60, Section 76(1) (Eng.). There are, however, ex-
emptions contained in the 1991 Financial Services Regulations (Promotion of Unregulated
Schemes). Section 76 of the Financial Services Act will soon be replaced by section 238 of
the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, and the regulations will be replaced by the
Conduct of Business Rules at 3.11 (COB 3.11 regime). Under this regime, a financial pro-
motion relating to an unregulated collective investment scheme may be communicated or
approved for communication to authorized persons, exempt persons, sophisticated investors
and high net worth companies, provided that the relevant provisions of the exemption order
are satisfied.
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If the model price was lower than the market price, the program would rec-
ommend selling the security and waiting to buy at a lower price in the fu-
ture. If the model price was higher than the market price the opposite
would follow. The fund was leveraged and designed to capitalize on small
variances in the price of securities. In the summer of 1998, Shaw's trading
strategy was based on the theory that the spread between U.S. treasuries and
foreign corporate debt would narrow. Unfortunately, the Russian default of
August 17, 1998 meant that instead of narrowing, such spreads widened
considerably as investors rushed to get out of risky and into safer invest-
ments - the so-called "flight to quality." In an increasingly downward spi-
ral, the hedge funds with the most highly leveraged portfolios fell first,
which caused the spread to widen ever further, piling up greater losses for
the fund.
Some hedge fund managers seriously misjudged the timing of the fall
in prices of technology and dot.com stocks, shorting them when they were
still rising. Faced with such a potentially disastrous situation, there is a
temptation to try to disguise such losses and sweat it out in the hope of the
market turning in a more favorable direction. One technique that has been
applied in this situation is to disguise the downward effect on the price of
securities caused by stock splits in an attempt to mislead investors as to the
success of their ill-fated short selling strategies. The many well-
documented cases of fraud and malpractice in involving hedge fund man-
gers and advisers demonstrate only too clearly, however, that many rich and
supposedly experienced investors may be just as susceptible to the blan-
dishments of the investment fraudster as are the ordinary Joes who buy into
mutual funds or the stock market.
9
II. HIGH NET WORTH INVESTORS AND OTC DERIVATIVE
MARKETS
A. Asymmetry of Information
Derivatives, including OTC products, feature heavily in the portfolios
of some hedge fund managers. Long Term Capital Management was a fund
that was set up expressly to create profits through the use of such deriva-
tives.10 While exchange-traded products are themselves heavily regulated
and subject to significant disclosure regimes, the OTC markets are, in com-
parison, relatively opaque. This lack of regulation and disclosure creates
9 For a more substantive discussion of these cases, see Helen Parry, From Masters of the
Universe to Aunt Agatha: Protecting the Investor in the Hedge Fund Environment, in HEDGE
FUNDS LAW AND REGULATION, 173-193 (Cullen and Parry eds., 2001).
10 "Unlike Proctor and Gamble, Gibson Greetings and Orange County, Long Term Capi-
tal is a hedge fund that was expressly created to reap profits by trading derivatives. "Lynn A
Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculation: Regulation and Private Ordering in the Market for
OTC Derivatives, 48 DuKE L.J. 701,781 (1999).
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additional problems with the asymmetry of information that inevitably ex-
ists between contracting parties, leaving investors vulnerable to the sellers
of products with regard to fair valuation and other issues. The law reports
bristle with cases involving extremely sophisticated investors, including the
treasury departments of major corporations and public sector institutions,
who have suffered huge losses as a result of their involvement in such mar-
kets. High net worth individuals are potentially even more vulnerable. The
availability of resources to employ in the project of redressing gross asym-
metries of information between contracting parties is not necessarily the an-
swer to the problem. In many cases, it is very difficult for the end user of a
derivative product to discover its true value, given the way in which such
products are created and marketed by investment banks. Regulatory re-
gimes, however, do presume that the availability of resources and/ or know-
how on the part of an end user leaves him free to engage in highly risky in-
vestment strategies in a relatively unregulated environment. For these in-
vestors, it really is a case of caveat emptor.
B. Customer Classification and the High Net Worth Individual in the U.K.
In the U.K., private clients who are advised by market professionals as
to their choice of investment have been well protected by the regulatory re-
gime of the Financial Services Act of 1986 ("FS Act") and the rulebooks of
the self-regulatory organizations ("SROs"). Such investors must not be ad-
vised to enter into investments that are not suitable for them in their circum-
stances. However, under the rules of the Securities and Futures Authority
("SFA"), private clients may choose to contract out of such protection and
agree be classified as expert investors. Expert investors lose much of the
basic protection afforded ordinary private clients. The firm must, however,
believe, on reasonable grounds, that the investor has sufficient understand-
ing and experience to waive SFA protection.11 Clients may be tempted to
waive their rights on economic grounds. Firms usually charge lower fees to
expert investors. Some firms simply will not entertain any protected private
client business at all.12 Recent case law shows us, however, that when
markets move against client positions, high net worth individuals may seek
to run for the cover of the enhanced protection afforded to the private client,
querying the validity of the classification or even the regulatory regime
governing their investments.
The one crucial right of action which clients waive when they are clas-
sified as an expert investors under SFA rules is the right to sue the firm if it
is found to be in breach of an SRO rule and to have caused loss to the client
" Larussa-Chigi v. First Boston Ltd., Q.B. (Comm. Ct.) (1997), 1997 WL 1103582.
12 See e.g. Trevor Norwood and Patrick Thompson, Investor Classification, Compliance
Monitor, Oct. 1996, 58-59.
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as a result.13 If firms err in classifying a customer as expert, when they
cannot show that they had reasonable grounds to believe that the investor
had sufficient understanding and experience, and if they then fail to main-
tain adequate regimes of compliance, they risk such litigation and the resul-
tant risk of bearing great market losses if they lose.
A recent case before the High Court in London concerned a breach of
contract action brought by a major investment bank against an HNWI who
had failed to repurchase a heavily leveraged and complex forex related
structured note. The investment was predicated on the notion that the pe-
seta and the lire would remain as strong against the dollar and the yen, or
would get stronger. In the currency markets turmoil of September 1992, the
investment lost seventy percent of its value. In the face of such losses (ap-
proximately $7,000,000), the client declined to repurchase the investment at
the original price and was therefore, prima facie, in breach of contract.
The firm that sold the notes claimed initially that the client was an ex-
pert investor, but it did eventually concede that this was not the case be-
cause, although he did have some experience in currency swaps markets, he
had not previously invested in such highly complex and leveraged products.
He did, however, "acquire a certain amount of knowledge about foreign
currencies, their strengths and weaknesses and the fact that a weak currency
would normally give a higher interest rate on investments than a strong
one."14
The report of the litigation includes details concerning the client's pre-
vious experience in the markets, and provides an interesting analysis of the
nature of investment experience that an investor needs to have in order that
he may be found to have properly waived his rights and to have properly
been categorized as an expert. He had experience with straight forward cur-
rency swaps, investments that had not involved any borrowing, and had
previously invested in a currency fund, the objective of which was to
"achieve exceptional returns for sophisticated investors willing and able to
bear the risks of prudent but aggressive trading strategy in spot and forward
contracts and in over-the-counter (OTC) options FX."15 That fund was lev-
eraged, in that it was fund policy to maintain positions of up to 10 times the
fund's net asset value at any one time. The scheme was categorized as an
unregulated collective investment scheme that, under the FS Act, may not
normally be marketed to individual investors, unless they are experienced
investors in accordance with the regulations governing these schemes or ex-
isting clients for whom such investments were suitable.
16
13 Financial Services Act, 1986, c. 5, Section 62 (Eng.) [hereinafter FS Act].
"
4 J. Longmore in Morgan Stanley UK Group v. Puglisi Consentino, C.L.C. 481 QBD
(Comm. Ct. 1998).
1S Id.
16 See supra text accompanying note 8.
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Although the issue of suitability was not specifically at issue with re-
gard to the investments in these funds, the court did express the view that in
all the circumstances the investment was not suitable for such a client. The
regulation that permits firms to market unregulated schemes to existing cus-
tomers for whom the scheme is deemed to be suitable is one of the main
provisions allowing the marketing of such schemes to HNWIs.
With regard to the dispute concerning the structured notes that were the
subject of the litigation, the firm initially argued that the client was an ex-
pert investor and was not therefore protected by many of the rules of the
SRO specifically addressing the protection of private clients, but it eventu-
ally conceded that this was not the case. Although the client did have pre-
vious experience with both currency markets and leverage, the court
considered the products that he bought under the structured note agreement
to be in a different league. The level of complexity was very much greater
than that involved in his previous trades. The investments consisted of a
bond, the redemption value of which was to be calculated by reference to a
formula based on a short position in one or more hard currencies, and a long
position in one or more soft currencies. The redemption value of the bond
however, could never be negative, according to an express term in the bond,
which, although referred to commercially as an "embedded option"', was
expressed contractually as a proviso.
Once it had been accepted that the defendant was a private client for
the purposes of the legislation, he was able to use the right to suit contained
in Section 62 of the FS Act as a shield and the basis for a counterclaim for
breach of statutory duty.
Although the facts were hotly disputed, the court decided, on the basis
of the testimony presented to it, that the bank was in breach of several SRO
rules relating to, inter alia, risk warnings and suitability. The case also
raised issues connected to the documentation provided to the client. The
product was not adequately explained - particularly in the light of the fact
that the client did not speak good English; there were no product-specific
risk warnings; the client was not given sufficient time to consider complex
legal documentation before being asked to sign it and the classification noti-
fication omitted the terms of business which were to be attached.
The court also found that the bank sold him a product that was contrary
to his recorded investment objectives (conservation of capital and long term
growth) and that they had lacked an appropriate basis for classifying him or
assessing his wealth.
17
The parties agreed that any damages due to the plaintiff for the defen-
dant's breach of contract would be at least equalled by the damages they
17 See also Kviatkowski v. Bear, Steams & Co. Inc., No. Civ. 4798 (JGK), 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 19966, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 1999).
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would owe him for breach of statutory duty under Section 62(1) of the FS
Act.1
8
In another case, a HNWW, whose currency trades had turned sour,
sought to claim that margin calls of £2.6 million made on a letter of credit
that she had provided, as security, had not been properly made. A prelimi-
nary point at issue was the question of which regulatory regime applied to
her relationship with her broker. She was initially classified as an expert
investor under SFA rules, but the London Code of Conduct for Wholesale
Markets governed the currency trades that were done for her. 19 She argued
that the initial classification was made in breach of SFA Rules because it
was made on the basis of an investor classification questionnaire which she
claimed to have signed without answering any of the questions that ap-
peared on it except for those inquiring as to her name and address. If the
court had decided that SFA Rules did apply to this classification, and that
there had been a breach of these rules, then she may have had a right of ac-
tion against her broker under Section 62 of the FS Act. The court, however,
found against her on the point with regard to the applicable regime, holding
that her forex trading constituted London Code transactions within the
wholesale markets regime and so that was the regime that applied contrac-
tually to the relationship between herself and her broker. The court rejected
her argument that SFA rules applied to precontractual communications.
There was therefore no possibility that she could seek to take action against
the firm under Section 62.
C. Ultra High Net Worth Individuals and the U.S. OTC Derivatives Market
The quite startlingly high levels of leverage and speculation engaged in
by the client in the Puglisi case (up to $60 million at risk through a number
of products) pale into insignificance when compared to the several billion
dollars in forex and other products traded by an ultra high net worth indi-
vidual who recently sued his bankers for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty and
negligence.20 His net worth was stated to be $100 million. The slump in
the price of the dollar caused him to lose over $200 million. Speculation on
this scale carries a high risk of creating such huge losses, which frequently
provoke the parties concerned to seek the intervention of the courts. In this
case, the client instigated an action for fraud (which he lost) and then con-
tinued with a civil action for damages on grounds of breach of fiduciary
duty and negligence. An action for summary judgement brought by the
brokers seeking to close the civil case was, however, dismissed by the
court. The client claimed that his broker failed to make sufficient inquiries
18 See Morgan Stanley U.K. Group v. Puglisi Consentino C.L.C. 481, Longmore, J. QBD
(Comm Ct. 1998).
19 Promulgated by the Bank of England for certain categories of exempt persons carrying
out business under section 43 of the FS Act.
20 See Kwiatkowski, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19966, at *1.
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as to his investment objectives, failed to warn him that certain investments
were not suitable for him, and failed to advise him about the heightened risk
that he ran when his on-exchange positions were moved into the OTC mar-
ket without his knowledge. Disputes between clients and their brokers and
bankers frequently turn on disputed facts concerning issues such as these.
Perhaps it is easy to assume that such wealthy individuals have only them-
selves to blame when they enter into such large and risky positions and
should not seek to escape from their losses when the markets move against
them.
End users may have access to very sophisticated analytical tools to
help them understand and calculate the risks that they run when investing in
complicated investment products. In one significant recent case, a first in-
stance decision in favor of an investor was reversed on appeal. The investor
was the treasurer to a group of community colleges and he lost $50 million
- about half of the colleges' investment portfolio - in the collateralized
mortgage obligations ("CMO") market. He purchased very risky and vola-
tile principal only "G" and "H" tranches of the issue that would receive no
payments until all preceding letter tranches had been paid. However, he did
have access to a split screen Bloomberg system, which cost $20,000 per
year to run. This system provided information about mortgage rates and
analyzed yield tables. The investor admitted to the court that he "had
learned to pull up the yield table and to put in the price of securities as it
was offered and to substitute various PSAs in the table and to see [how]
these things would affect the projected yield and payment window."21
In addition to his admitted skill in dealing with this system, the court
found that the investor had significant experience trading in this particular
type of security with other brokers; that he was initially reticent about enter-
ing into a relationship with the seller; and that his investment strategy of
buying and selling quickly, taking a profit, showed that he was a sophisti-
cated and experienced investor. The statements that were at issue with re-
gard to the question of misrepresentation on the part of the seller were,
however, concerned with predictions about future movement of interest
rates. The court found in favor of the seller, holding, inter alia, that the in-
vestor was experienced and should have known that it was not possible to
predict the future movement of interest rates.
III. OTC DERIVATIVES AND ENFORCEABILITY UNDER U.S. LAW
A. Forex, Swaps and Hybrids
While the CFTC has traditionally enjoyed jurisdiction over exchange-
traded futures and options, anyone found trading in off-exchange futures
was considered to be committing a crime. Forex futures contracts entered
21 Westcap Enter.s et al. v. City Coll.s of Chi., 230 F.3d 717, 730 (2000).
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into off-exchange were, on the other hand, specifically allowed by the
Treasury Amendment to the Commodity Exchange Act.22 Off-exchange
forex options are also covered by the Amendment. While most forex trad-
ing takes place in a wholesale environment by experienced market profes-
sionals, it is clear from the U.S. and U.K. cases cited above, that high net
worth individuals are now being drawn into these markets, often with rather
disastrous consequences.
Given the stark choice of either engaging in a fully valid and enforce-
able contract when trading futures and options on-exchange, and commit-
ting a criminal act when trading them off-exchange, it is hardly surprising
that market players in the 80's and 90's have been plagued by a sense of
uncertainty and ambiguity concerning the precise legal status of the plethora
of financially-engineered OTC products, such as swaps and hybrids, that
dedicated rocket scientists in investment banks have introduced into an in-
creasingly bewildered and bemused marketplace. While some derivatives
(such as mortgage backed securities) are clearly categorized as securities,
many of these instruments lack clear statutory definition. They do perform
similar economic functions to exchange-traded derivatives and some com-
mentators consider that they should in fact be classified as futures and op-
tions, which should only be traded on an exchange in a highly regulated
environment overseen .by the CFTC. Some swaps and hybrids have been
given specific protection, but the absence of a clear overarching statutory
regime to cover OTC derivatives generally has become an increasingly dif-
ficult problem for the markets to deal with. Matters came to a head in 1998
when the CFTC informed the world that it was going to look again at the
whole issue of OTC derivative regulation, warning that they might be pre-
pared to take the view that they were in fact futures and options and should
be brought into an exchange-traded environment.25
22 See Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. Section 2 (1997). "Nothing in this chapter
shall be deemed to govern or be in any way applicable to transactions in foreign currency,
security warrants, security rights, resales of instalment loan contracts, repurchase options,
government securities, or mortgages and mortgage purchase commitments, unless such
transactions involve the sale thereof for future delivery conducted on a board of trade."
23 See Dunn v. CFTC, 519 U.S. 465, 465 (1997) (where position was clarified regarding
forex futures contracts entered into off exchange).
24 See Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-546, 106 Stat. 3590 (1992)
(where the CFTC was granted this exemptive authority). Structured notes that are hybrid fi-
nancial instruments could be futures or commodity options contracts if they do not meet the
terms and conditions of the CFTC hybrid instrument exemption. Regulation of Hybrid In-
struments, 17 C.F.R. pt. 34 (2001). The CFTC granted swaps and hybrids administrative ex-
emptions from the CFTC Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992.
25 See Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Issues Concept Release Concerning Over-the-
Counter Derivatives Market (May 7, 1998), available at
http://www.cftc.gov/opa/press98/opa4142-98.htm (last visited April 6, 2001).
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B. The Commodity Futures Modernization Act 2000
This provocative stance provoked a storm of protest by banking and
securities industry regulators and the issue has now been addressed in the
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 ("CFMA"). This act
makes it clear that OTC derivatives, swaps and hybrids do not come within
the jurisdiction of the CEA and the CFTC and are not illegal or unenforce-
able contracts.2 6 The threat of heavy regulation of the OTC market had
been sufficient to induce some major investment banks to threaten to close
down their U.S. operations and move to the more benign regulatory envi-
ronment of London.
27
Some commentators have proposed that a better solution would be to
expressly decriminalize all OTC trading and to render it contractually unen-
forceable unless it could be shown to have been carried out for the purpose
of hedging. Such a regime would simply be a harking back to the basic
common law position concerning contracts for differences. This would, it
is argued, help to rid the markets of excessive speculation, including specu-
lation by I-NWIs, because the only players that would be able to take part
would be those with significant reputational capital. Some contemporary
economic theorists have suggested that excessive speculation is bad for the
economy as a whole and that it would be beneficial for excessive specula-
tion to be squeezed out of the markets. It is hard to disagree entirely with
such a view when looking at contemporary markets in the throws of the
spectacular bursting of the speculation-fuelled dot.com bubble.29
C. Enforceability and Derivatives Contracts Under English Law
The proposition that an OTC derivative contract was unenforceable,
unless carried out for hedging purposes, was argued in a case heard in the
Court of Appeal in London. The dispute centered on the issue of the en-
26 See Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, H.R. 4541, 106 ' Cong. Section
102 (2d Sess. 2000).
27 "Let me be frank. If the legal uncertainty posed by CFTC assertions of jurisdiction is
not removed, Chase will be forced to move this business to another location, probably Lon-
don, where we don't have the specter of legal jeopardy that has been raised by the CFTC. A
substantial portion of this business is mobile. In the case of products done with individual
customers, if the customers are in the U.S. and we can't avoid the legal uncertainty by book-
ing the business outside the U.S., we may stop doing business with U.S. customers." Finan-
cial Derivatives Supervisory Improvement Act of 1998 and Financial Contract Netting
Improvement Act: Hearing on H.R. 4062 and H.R. 4239 Before the House Comm. On Bank-
ing and Financial Services, 105th Cong. 11 (1998) (statement of Dennis Oakley, Managing
Director of Global Markets, The Chase Manhattan Bank).
28 "Under the common law traders were free to enter off-exchange difference agreements
that did not serve an indemnity (hedging) purpose. However, because such agreements were
legally unenforceable, traders had to find private mechanisms to enforce them. " Stout, supra
note 10, at 777.
29 Id.
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forceability of a gambling debt, which a young city worker was facing after
he placed a spread bet with his financial bookmaker, betting on the move-
ment of the Dow Jones index and the price of Treasury Bonds. 3 0 When
sued for the debt, the defendant punter argued that it was unenforceable un-
der the Gaming Acts as a gambling debt. The plaintiffs case was, how-
ever, that while that may be true, such debts are nevertheless enforceable by
virtue of Section 63 of the FS Act. This section provides that while an
agreement may be a gambling debt for the purposes of the Gaming Acts, if
it falls within the definition of investment business as defined in the FS Act,
it will be enforceable. The plaintiff argued that a spread bet on a financial
index was an investment, as defined in paragraph 9 of Schedule 1 of the FS
Act and that the business of a financial bookmaker was investment business
as defined in the FS Act.3 ' The Court of Appeal found for the plaintiff and
held the gambling debt to be enforceable against the losing punter.
D. The Background to the Litigation: Enforceability and Contracts for
Differences at Common Law
Section 63 of the FS Act clarified the legal position concerning the en-
forceability of contracts for differences. This category of investment covers
a range of OTC derivative products, including swaps and structured notes.32
The common law position was unclear. There is a strand of judicial opinion
that considers contracts for differences to be void and unenforceable as
gambling contracts, unless both parties had an actual intention that the title
3' For each possible bet, financial bookmakers quote a "spread", which consists of 2
numbers, the second higher than the first. With each bet, customers have a choice. They can
either choose a number below the lower number (effectively going short) or higher than the
higher number (going long). They must then choose how much money to bet on each point.
If they guess correctly as to the direction of the index they win a sum of money calculated by
multiplying the amount bet per point by the number of points above or below the spread. If
they are incorrect in their prediction, their losses are calculated in the same way.
31 Section 63(1) provides that "No contract to which this section applies shall be void by
reason of (a) section 18 of the Gaming Act 1845, Section 1 of the Gaming Act 1892 or any
corresponding provisions in force in Northern Ireland.(2) This section applies to any contract
entered into by either party by way of business and the making or performance of which by
either party constitutes an activity which falls within paragraph 12 of Schedule I top this Act
or would do so apart from parts II and IV of that Schedule." Financial Services Act, 1986, c.
60 sect. 63, sch.1.
"Investment Business" includes business concerning investments which include "Rights
under a contract for differences or under any other contract the purpose or intended purpose
of which is to secure a profit or avoid a loss by reference to fluctuations in the value or price
of property of any description or in an index or other factor designated for that purpose in the
contract." Id.
32 For the position on swaps, see text infra at p. 19. Structured notes were classified as
contracts for differences in Morgan Stanley U.K. Group v Puglisi Cosentino [1998 C.L.C.
481 (QBD) (Comm Ct). For a discussion of this case see Helen Parry " How Black
Wednesday Broke Morgan Stanley's String of P.E.R.L.S " Compliance Monitor May 1998
pp. 407 - 409.
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of the shares or commodities concerned would pass between them and de-
livery would take place.3 3 However, there is another strand of judicial
opinion that asserts that, provided that the contract does provide, in terms
for delivery, then the subjective intentions of the parties are irrelevant.34
This latter approach would have provided comfort at least for futures mar-
kets contracts that have delivery provisions within their terms, but even this
more liberal approach casts doubt on the validity of purely cash-settled con-
tracts based on commodities or financial instruments or indices. In London
in the early 80's, the derivatives community was naturally concerned that a
court could declare that a significant proportion of the contracts traded on
the floor of the various futures exchanges were unenforceable gaming con-
tracts. This created a significant legal risk. The exchanges formed a com-
mittee to lobby the government to press for a specific statutory reform to
make it absolutely clear that this was not the case with regard to the busi-
ness on the London exchanges. Such a statute never came into being, but
the essence of the request was dealt with through the inclusion of Section
63 of the FS Act.
E. The Decision of the Court of Appeal
However, the Court of Appeal had to agree that financial spread bet-
ting could not be distinguished from exchange-traded cash-settled futures
and index futures. Such bets were contracts for differences or other con-
tracts within paragraph 9 of Schedule 1 of the FS Act and therefore were
indeed enforceable. Undaunted, the defendant then argued that the wording
of paragraph 9 should be interpreted to apply only to a hedging contract and
not to a naked bet because the expression "to secure a profit" in paragraph 9
must mean to hedge an existing profit. His argument, however, was not ac-
cepted by the court. It examined the legislative ancestry of the section and
decided that it was probably derived from an earlier statute, the Prevention
of Frauds (Investments) Act of 1939, where the word "secure" was used to
mean "obtain" and not to protect an existing profit.
A few years later, paragraph 9 again fell to be interpreted by the High
Court in an action brought by the same bookmaker to recover a debt based
on a sporting index. Lord Justice Legatt, in City Index v. Sadri (unre-
ported), reluctantly decided that he could not interpret paragraph 9 in such a
way as to distinguish between spread betting financial and sporting indices.
The defendant punter was found liable to pay up on his gambling debts on
cricket and horse racing. This judgment has produced the rather bizarre re-
sult that a spread bet on, for example, the number of stretcher cases that
may be carried off the field during a major football tournament, is classified
33 See Universal Stock Exch. Ltd. v. David Strachan, 1896 A.C. 166;. Grizewood v.
Blanc, 11 C.B. 526 (1851).
34 Cooper v. Stubbs, 2 K.B. 753 (1925); Salt v. Chamberlain, 1979 S.T.C. 750, 753.
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as an investment. Legatt, in his judgment, did, however, recommend that
the Secretary of State at the Department of Trade and Industry exercise his
powers under Section 2 of the FS Act to remove this anomaly by expressly
excluding sports spread betting from the ambit of paragraph 9. Treasury
Minister Anthony Nelson appeared to have taken this suggestion to heart
when he went on the record to describe the inclusion of such spread betting
within the definition of investment as "unintended." A proposal to do pre-
cisely this was included in the proposals by the government "Deregulation
Task Force". Surprisingly, however, this proposal was later dropped and
the position remains the same. This volte-face followed a strong lobby
mounted by the bookmakers, arguing a case for maintaining the status quo
on the basis of the high risk involved in such betting and the need for con-
sumer protection.
The question as to whether swaps are gaming contracts was considered
in Morgan Grenfell v. Welwyn Hatfield DC,35 a dispute concerning the is-
sue of restitution in the context of interest rate swaps cases in the aftermath
of the notorious Hazell v. Hammersmith and Fulham. In Hazell, the court
had decided, much to the consternation of the professionals in the swaps
market that local authorities lacked the power to enter into swap con-
tracts. 3  Mr. Justice Hobhouse, in Grenfell, which was a case concerning
an interest rate swap in which the defendant local authority was to pay a
floating rate of interest to the plaintiff in return for a fixed rate, took the
view that swaps were contracts for differences and could possibly be seen to
be gaming contracts.3 7 Although the court has not directly addressed the
point, it is presumed that even if swaps were found to be gaming contracts,
they would still be enforceable by virtue of Section 63 of the FS Act.
F. Bear Markets and Investor Demand for Speculative Short Selling
Equity Contracts for Differences and Single Stock Futures
While the bear market conditions prevailing in 2001 and the concomi-
tant demand for short selling opportunities are the engine driving the re-
newed vigor of the markets for hedge funds, that same demand is prompting
the financial services industry, both on- and off-exchange to develop new
products that provide investors with opportunities for taking short specula-
tive positions that can offset some of the losses they are carrying on their
equity portfolios. In London, financial bookmakers and futures brokers are
starting to offer equity contracts for differences ("ECFDs"), which are ar-
rangements whereby one party agrees to either pay or receive the difference
between the market value of a share or a basket of shares on a specified fu-
ture date and the value of a strike price, usually the value of the single share
15 1 All E.R. 1, 7 (1995).
16 See 1 All E.R. 545 (1991).
37 Grenfell, I All E.R. at 7.
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on the date of the agreement. They are similar to both call options and the
new single stock futures contracts being launched by exchanges in London.
ECFDs are offered on single stocks on margins of between 10 and 20 per-
cent and are promoted as being particularly suitable for large volume short-
term speculation. Transaction costs for these products generally exceed
those for financial spread betting, partly because of the added cost 6f bet-
ting tax involved in spread betting. On the other hand, financial spread bet-
ting profits are not subject to capital gains tax. ECFDs are the true
ancestors of the equity contracts for differences which feature in the nine-
teenth century cases cited above.38 The terms of business of these Victorian
CFDs included, in one instance, conditions that were not dissimilar in effect
to terms that bankers use today when selling swaps to major corporations.
They made it crystal clear that the seller was purporting to eschew any pos-
sible liability for fiduciary duties towards clients, stating explicitly that they
were acting as principals and at arms length and absolutely not as agents.
The terms went on to provide that the customer must understand what that
means and that they should understand "all the rudiments of stock and share
dealing." The company furthermore stipulated that "it is an absolute condi-
tion that a customer, before opening an account should satisfy himself as to,
and acknowledge that he fully understands the company's terms and meth-
ods of doing business. 39
Single stock futures contracts have recently been introduced as an ex-
change traded product in London; they are expected to be on offer in the
U.S. by the end of the year. This is becoming possible now that the Com-
modity Futures Modernization Act, signed by President Clinton in Decem-
ber 2000, has removed the prohibition on trading such products and futures
based on narrow equity indices that was imposed by the Shad Johnson Ju-
risdictional Accord of 1982. The reason for the ban was the SEC's concern
that such products would be subject to abusive practices such market ma-
nipulation and insider dealing. This concern arose because the CEA did not
specifically contain a prohibition on insider dealing, and because the CEA
antifraud provisions were inadequate to prevent fraudulent price manipula-
tion because they dealt only with trading for or on behalf of another person,
and not for one's own account.4 °
Liffe, the London derivative market, has signed an alliance with
Nasdaq that covers single stock futures. This alliance was announced in
March 2001 to the effect that Nasdaq and LIFFE, the London International
Financial Futures and Options Exchange will form a U.S. regulated entity,
38 See, Universal, supra note 31.
39 Id.
40 Daniel F. Zimmerman, CFTC Authorisation in the Wake of Long Term Capital Man-
agement. 121 COLum. Bus. L. P. 9 (2000).
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which will list single stock futures on global companies through LIFFE's
electronic trading platform CONNECTr .
IV. FOREX MARKETS AND THE RETAIL INVESTOR
IN THE U.S. AND U.K.
The CFMA does, however, grant jurisdiction to the CFTC to deal with
unregulated retail Forex trading. The Act makes it clear that the CFTC
has the jurisdiction and authority to investigate and take legal action to
close down a wide assortment of unregulated firms offering or selling forex
futures and options to the general public. The CFTC further has jurisdiction
to investigate and prosecute forex fraud occurring in its registered firms and
their affliates. The CFTC has issued a major warning to consumers to be
aware of the risks in such trading.43 Retail customers in the U.K. and other
European countries have also been targeted by Forex boilerhouses in the
past few years. One major regulatory issue which was raised by such ac-
tivities was the effect of EU "passporting" provisions, which allow those
doing investment business in one member state to be "passported" to carry
out investment business throughout the EU under the terms of the Invest-
ment Services Directive. A number of forex and other boilerhouse opera-
tions were set up in Copenhagen in the 1990s in an attempt at regulatory
arbitrage. Denmark had not yet fully implemented its financial services
regulatory regime and was still processing applications for authorization
under its system. While such applications were being considered, it was
lawful to carry out investment business in Denmark. One firrn started to so-
licit forex investors in the U.K., claiming that it was passported to do so.
The court found subsequently that the passport provision applied only to
those whose applications had been accepted and who were fully authorized
under Danish law.44
V. THE CASE FOR GREATER PROTECTION FOR HIGH NET
WORTH INDIVIDUALS
A. Customer Classification
Regulators generally do not spend sleepless nights worrying about the
plight of millionaires who invest unsuccessfully in alternative markets such
as hedge funds and OTC derivatives. Their regulatory zeal is properly di-
rected at protecting the interests of investors of relatively modest means and
"I Nasdaq Press Release March 26, 2001.
42 Supra note 24.
43 Commission Advisory "Beware Foreign Currency Trading Fraud.", available at
www.cftc.gov/opa/enf98/forexa. 15htm.
44 Securities and Investments Board v. Scandex Capital Management A/S [1998] 1
W.L.R. 712.
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limited expertise, who potentially are more vulnerable to being "missold"
more mundane investment products. Such investors are transparently at a
disadvantage, given the severe asymmetry of information that is likely to
exist between themselves and the sellers of such products, and they clearly
need the enhanced regimes of investor protection that exist in the U.S. and
the U.K. However, in recent years, as more and more individuals are drawn
into the markets (particularly in the U.S. and increasingly in the U.K.) and
in todays bear markets, they are being tempted to venture into those sectors
which carry more risk and leverage and which have, for the most part, tradi-
tionally been considered to be the exclusive province of professionals.
Such markets have proved to be very strange, volatile and frightening
places even for relatively experienced investors, such as those who work for
the treasury departments of major corporations or public sector agencies.
The relatively new rich are particularly ripe targets for unscrupulous deriva-
tives salesmen and hedge fund advisers and managers. Unlike the tradi-
tional English target for an investment scam, who is quaintly known as
"Aunt Agatha" - a term redolent with images of elderly upper class spin-
sters, replete with inherited wealth but with no husband to look after it -
the new rich of today are more likely to be entertainers, sports stars or those
who have amassed wealth in the dot.com sector, and they may have practi-
cally no knowledge of or experience of any significance with financial mar-
kets or investing.
Such targets may be easily flattered into thinking that they have sud-
denly entered the magic kingdom and are members of an exclusive group
with access to unheard-of weird and wonderful investment opportunities
denied to their more down-market brethren. They may be seduced by the
prospect of lower commissions into agreeing to do business at arm's length
and as experienced investors, thereby potentially losing regulatory protec-
tion and the possibility of taking action against sellers for breach of statu-
tory or fiduciary duty. They may feel embarrassed and inadequate because
they cannot understand the real nature of the products that they are being
sold and they may fail to ask sellers for detailed explanations. The fact that
they may equip themselves with attractive toys such as Bloomberg Systems
(which they may only partially understand) may count against them in the
event of a lawsuit against their brokers. Furthermore, they may lack the
psychological fortitude necessary to deal with either the elation of success
or the crushing disappointment of failure in the markets.
I suggest that any regulatory regime that categorizes investors in terms
solely of their disposable income or wealth is inadequate. In order for an
investor to be apt for classification in terms of a reduced regime of investor
protection, the classification process must include a genuine filter based on
a real assessment of the level of sophistication and experience of that inves-
tor. Firms that fail to comply with the full rigour of regulatory provisions
concerning customer classification should do so at their peril.
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B. Alternative Investments and the Mass Market
While the hedge fund sector is seen to be heading for a boom period in
markets generally, with many new funds being set up targeted at high net
worth investors, there are increasing signs that the sector is now also going
down-market. The Chairman of the Financial Services Authority, Sir How-
ard Davies, recently issued a warning to investors to be aware of the risks
involved in "exotic ISAs.,,4  ISAs provide a means of tax-free investing
and they are aimed at the mass market of ordinary savers. Sir Howard is
exercised by the emergence of a number of funds of funds based ISAs,
which involve a manager selecting a range of hedge funds on behalf of the
investor. The firms offering these products are avoiding the general restric-
tions on marketing hedge funds either by running the schemes through in-
vestment trusts structured as listed companies, listed in London, Dublin or
the Channel Islands, or by marketing them indirectly through financial ad-
visors.46 The minimum investment for these products typically is £5000.
The consumer alert issued by the FSA warns consumers that ISAs that in-
vest in hedge funds or use derivatives linked to the performance of a com-
plex hedge fund index are now on offer to small savers and that such
products may not be suitable for a core investment. They may be high risk,
difficult to understand and may feature costs and charges that are not clear.
It warns further that shares linked to hedge funds and issued outside the
U.K. are being made available in an ISA wrapper. Similar schemes are
emerging elsewhere. In Australia, for example, new funds of funds
schemes are being launched that require minimum investments of
$A10,000. 47 Regulators must increase their vigilance and surveillance of
these trends.
VI. CONCLUSION
In 1998, the financial world held its breath as Long Term Capital Man-
agement dragged the markets towards the abyss of total systemic meltdown.
Since those torrid days, forests have been cut down to supply the mountains
of paper produced by the many committees and working parties that have
peered into that abyss in the hope of being able to devise a means of pre-
venting a reoccurrence. Such events may seem far removed from the world
45 Individual Savings Account. These were introduced in 1999 to replace personal equity
plans. They are not products in their own right, but tax-free wrappers, which means that
capital gains from the investment will not be taxable.46 Investment trusts are companies which exist purely to make money. They buy and sell
shares in other companies. They pool investors' money, enabling them to buy shares in hun-
dreds of other companies. They can invest in companies listed in the U.K. and foreign stock
markets. They are closed-end funds, where the amount of money that the trust raises to in-
vest is fixed at the start.
47 See John Collett, Opt for multi-managers, fund-of-fund, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD,
Feb. 10, 2001.
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of hedge fund ISAs, but the basic principles of hedge fund trading apply
whether the manager has 1000 clients who have put in £5000 each or 10
clients who have put in $500,000 each. Collective investment schemes that
deal in high-risk strategies such as short selling, the use of derivatives and
leverage are potentially a danger to investors. There is a need or greater
disclosure. This has been recognized by the Financial Services Authority in
the U.K. It is clear that most of the significant issues concerning LTCM
were well-understood and flagged up in the days immediately succeeding
the crisis, but the ground perceptibly shifted from an initial wariness at di-
rectly regulating hedge funds, to the active endorsement by the FSA of pub-
lic disclosure requirements, combined with an ongoing program of
voluntary industry-based reform of hedge fund risk management practices.
The nettle has been grasped, but the threat remains that if hedge funds
do not put their own house in order they may find themselves facing a full-
scale regime of regulation similar to that regulating authorized firms in the
U.K. Regulators must be alert to the fact that there is an army of individual
investors out there, both rich and not so rich, who have had their fingers
burned in the dot.com crash. Many of them may never have heard of Long
Term Capital Management, and may be avidly pouring over glossy bro-
chures and websites proclaiming their ability to make money in a bear mar-
ket by engaging in alternative investment strategies such as hedge funds,
CFDs, financial spread betting and single stock futures. Increasingly, such
investments are not engaged in for frivolous reasons, but rather to provide
for basic necessities such as health education and retirement income. In
bear markets, regulators must be acutely alive to the extra risks that inexpe-
rienced investors may unwittingly be taking on, driven, all too often, by a
toxic combination of fear and greed. Even millionaires need to be protected.
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